CONTORTING COMMON ARTICLE 3: REFLECTIONS ON THE
REVISED ICRC COMMENTARY
Michael A. Newton*
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Revised
Commentary on the First Geneva Convention issued in 2016 advances an
understanding of Common Article 3 that is supported neither by its plain text
nor its negotiating history. The ICRC Revised Commentary posits as an
unquestioned aspect of lex lata that Common Article 3 encompasses crimes
committed during non-international armed conflicts between members of the
same fighting force. This extension represents a laudable humanitarian
impulse, yet it appears for the first time in the Revised Commentary as a selfstanding truism without regard to its potentially lamentable larger effects.
The ICRC also embraces without caveat what appears to be an unseemly
symbiosis with ongoing litigation in the International Criminal Court (ICC)
case Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda.
This short Essay describes the circularity of support between the ICRC
and the Chambers of the ICC. Its successive sections describe the
problematic potential of extending the substantive coverage of Common
Article 3 to encompass members of the same armed group who commit
criminal acts against one another.1 In particular, the Revised Commentary
fails to address the due process ramifications of an enlarged Common Article
3, even as the development of the text documented by the readily available
negotiating record warrants an alternative understanding. Lastly, the ICRC
position could indicate a radical shift in the very design of the field of
international humanitarian law.2 This Essay closes by restating the
*

Professor of the Practice of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School, http://law.vander
bilt.edu/bio/michael-newton. The author is deeply appreciative to Dapo Akande, Ray
Murphy, Kevin Stack, and the participants in the University of Georgia Law School
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1
The ICC Statute largely replicates the text of Common Article 3 in Article 8(2)(c). The
slight differences between the texts are the result of stylistic changes but the substantive
protections afforded are identical. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art.
8(2)(c), July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.183/9 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
2
The classic concept of “the law of war” has shifted over time and in the modern usage the
terms “law of armed conflict” and “international humanitarian law” and “the laws and
customs of war” are now used interchangeably. Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Concurrent
Application: A Victim Perspective, in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW: TOWARDS A NEW MERGER IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 237, 242 (Roberta Arnold &
Noëlle Quénivet eds., 2008).
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imperative balance between military pragmatism and humanitarian
imperatives that is preserved by the careful blending of values within the
laws and customs of warfare. While wholly appealing on humanitarian
grounds, particularly on the facts presented in Ntaganda, the reconceived
approach to Common Article 3 may well endanger the larger structure of
international humanitarian law. The Revised ICRC Commentary omits any
mention of these competing concerns.
Common Article 3 represents by all accounts one of the “most important
Articles” of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.3 As such, it figures prominently
in the modern jurisprudence.4 The ICRC Commentary of 2016 explains and
strengthens the extant jurisprudential basis for applying Common Article 3 in
admirable ways. The Revised ICRC Commentary does great service to the
profession and public by providing a tour de force of the structure and law
behind Common Article 3 as it has evolved since the 1952 publication of the
classic Pictet Commentaries (also issued under ICRC auspices).5 In modern
operations, the mandate for humane treatment to all persons is
unquestionably established as one of the most important legal tenets
restraining unfettered military discretion. The principle of humane treatment
without adverse distinction is explicit on the face of Common Article 3 vis-àvis civilians and persons who are not participating in the conflict, but flows
through other norms to require fighters to “refrain from cruelties and
perfidious acts also against fighters” during all armed conflicts.6

3
INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE FIRST GENEVA
CONVENTION: CONVENTION (I) FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED
AND SICK IN ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD 38 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1952) [hereinafter Pictet
Commentary on Common Article 3], https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Com
ment.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=1919123E0D121FEFC12563CD0041FC08.
4
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Trial Judgement, ¶ 166 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 3, 2000), http://icty.org/x/cases/blaskic/tjug/en/bla-tj00
0303e.pdf (“Common Article 3 must be considered as a rule of customary international law.”);
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac & Vukovic, Case Nos. IT-96-23, IT-96-23/1-A, Appeals
Judgement, ¶ 49-70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2002) (extending
the coverage of Common Article 3 to include rapes committed during armed conflict not of an
international character and rejecting arguments that Common Article 3 is limited to the
protection of property and the proper use of permitted weapons).
5
The Pictet Commentaries were based “primarily on the negotiating history of the
respective treaties, as observed firsthand by the authors, and on prior practice, especially that
of World War II. They contain important institutional and historical knowledge and, in this
respect, retain their value.” Lindsey Cameron et al., The Updated Commentary on the First
Geneva Convention – a New Tool for Generating Respect for International Humanitarian
Law, 97 INT. REV. RED CROSS 1209, 1214 (2015).
6
Dieter Fleck, The Law of Non-international Armed Conflict, in THE HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 592, ¶ 1203(4) (Dieter Fleck et al. eds., 3d ed. 2013).
See also 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, art. 75, June 8, 1977,
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Nevertheless, the normative structure of jus in bello exists to empower those
in the vortex of armed conflicts to balance legitimate military needs whilst
simultaneously achieving larger humanitarian imperatives. In the memorable
framing of Yoram Dinstein, “every single norm” within the laws and
customs of armed conflict operates as “a parallelogram of forces; it confronts
an inveterate tension between the demands of military necessity and
humanitarian considerations, working out a compromise formula.”7
The Revised ICRC policy position extending8 the application of Common
Article 3 to intra-party offenses committed by participants in the conflict
contorts its meaning and clouds the larger normative framework of the jus in
bello. To be clear, the ICRC Commentary asserts without support that
normal domestic criminal law may be bypassed in favor of prosecution based
on Common Article 3 during an armed conflict not of an international
character when conduct proscribed by its substantive provisions has been
committed by members of an armed group against victims fighting in the
same military or para-military organization. No examples of state practice or
jurisprudence support the ICRC assertion that the humanitarian protections
embedded in Common Article 3 may be extended to such intra-force
offenses. The ICRC simply cites to the ICC Prosecutor’s position in
charging Bosco Ntaganda as evidence that such an extension is warranted.9
Reliance on the ICC charging documents by the ICRC represents an
aspirational statement of lex ferenda because it is divorced from tenets of
established law and state practice. In fact, the ICC Prosecutor pointedly
went out of her way during her public press conference in the case of
Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda to express her pride that the theory of the case
by which the law of war encompasses “crimes committed against his own
group” represents “an innovation that the Office of the Prosecutor will be

1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force 7 December 1978), 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977) [hereinafter
Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), art. 4, June 8,
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 (entered into force 7 December 1978), 16 I.L.M. 1442 (1977).
7
YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
ARMED CONFLICT 5 (2d ed. 2010) (Professor Dinstein concludes the thought by noting that “it
can be categorically stated that no part of” the laws and customs of warfare “overlooks
military requirements, just as no part of [the law] loses sight of humanitarian considerations”).
8
Lindsey Cameron et al., Common Article 3: Conflicts not of an International Character,
in INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE FIRST GENEVA
CONVENTION: CONVENTION (I) FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED
AND SICK IN ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD ¶¶ 546–547 (Jean Marie Henckaerts et al., 2d. ed.
2016) [hereinafter Revised Commentary on Common Article 3], https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/
applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=59F6CDFA490736C1C
1257F7D004BA0EC.
9
Revised Commentary on Common Article 3, supra note 8, at n.293.
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bringing to international criminal justice.”10 Until Ntaganda, the premise
that “the laws of war applicable in internal armed conflicts bind members of
armed forces and armed groups vis-à-vis their opponents who share the same
nationality” was unchallenged in academia or extant case law.11 Indeed, the
ICRC website summarizes Common Article 3 by noting that it “requires
humane treatment for all persons in enemy hands,” because the text functions
like “a mini-Convention within the Conventions as it contains the essential
rules of the Geneva Conventions in a condensed format and makes them
applicable to conflicts not of an international character.”12
The text of the Revised 2016 Commentary does embed an odd duality in
that it also reflects the conventional understanding of Common Article 3 by
noting that non-state participants in conflicts “may be prosecuted under
domestic law for their participation in hostilities, including for acts that are
not unlawful under humanitarian law” articles of the Conventions.13 As any
modern practitioner recognizes, the full range of applicable human rights
treaties also protects various dimensions of humane treatment and remains
fully binding during non-international armed conflicts.14 This in turn means
that differing bodies of law, along with differing judicial enforcement
mechanisms, operate alongside each other to provide remedies for
impermissible inhumane treatment during armed conflicts.15
The universal practice since 1949 has been to treat participants in an
armed conflict of a non-international character as remaining fully subject to
the domestic criminal laws applicable either to their national jurisdictions or
the state that would normally exercise territorially based criminal
jurisdiction. In other words, the conventional and long-established framing
is that Common Article 3 instantiates fundamental humanitarian protections
to a defined set of victims caught in the midst of armed conflicts. The text
plainly states that Common Article 3 prohibits acts “committed against
persons taking no active part in the hostilities.”16 It predates the
development of human rights treaties, and is best understood in the modern
era as a supplementary gap-filler that creates a seamless web of basic rights
10

Fatou Bensouda, Ntaganda Case Press conference of 1 Sept. 2015, min. 33:38 to 34:07,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gOgZc-IgDIA.
11
EVE LA HAYE, WAR CRIMES IN INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICTS 119 (2008).
12
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Their Additional Protocols, INT’L COMM. OF THE
RED CROSS (Jan. 1, 2014), https://www.icrc.org/en/document/geneva-conventions-1949-addit
ional-protocols.
13
Revised Commentary on Common Article 3, supra note 8, ¶ 531.
14
See, e.g., DARAGH MURRAY, PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN ARMED
CONFLICT (2016); GERD OBERLEITNER, HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARMED CONFLICT: LAW, PRACTICE,
POLICY (2015).
15
Id. ¶¶ 1.04–1.86.
16
Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8(2)(c).
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applicable to all armed conflicts. The core substantive protections that flow
in the original text of the Geneva Conventions modify the concept of
“persons taking no active part in hostilities” by referring to crimes committed
“with respect to the above-mentioned persons.”17 Thus, the concept of
protecting persons “taking no active part in the hostilities” is the load-bearing
pillar from which the humanitarian protections of Common Article 3 flow.
Despite this textual clarity, the Revised ICRC Commentary embarks upon
an unsupported teleological theory to innovate a broader scope of Common
Article 3. Relying solely on the Prosecutor’s position in the charges filed in
Ntaganda, the Revised Commentary posits without caveat that “armed forces
of a Party to the conflict benefit from the application of common Article 3 by
their own Party.”18 It accordingly concludes that “[t]he fact that the trial is
undertaken or the abuse committed by their own Party should not be a
ground to deny such persons the protection of common Article 3.”19 As a
textual matter, this ICRC framing misstates the central dimension of
Common Article 3, which is to provide core protections to civilians, persons
rendered hors de combat for any reason, and all others “taking no active part
in hostilities.”20
The only purported justification for this dramatic
reformulation of Common Article 3 is the premise that distinguishing
between civilians and active participants in an armed conflict not of an
international character is complicated due to shared nationality of all
participants. Hence, the text posits as a self-standing justification that
“[l]imiting protection under common Article 3 to persons affiliated or
perceived to be affiliated with the opposing Party is therefore difficult to
reconcile with the protective purpose of common Article 3.”21
The mutually reinforcing analysis between the ICRC and the ongoing
litigation is clear upon closer examination. In filings that predated the
release of the ICRC Commentary, the ICC Office of the Prosecutor argued in
Ntaganda that the charges against an alleged perpetrator22 for the rape of
17

Pictet Commentary on Common Article 3, supra note 3 (emphasis added).
Revised Commentary on Common Article 3, supra note 8, ¶ 547.
19
Id.
20
M. Gandhi, Common Article 3 of Geneva Conventions, 1949 in Era of International
Criminal Tribunals, ISIL YEARBOOK OF INT’L AND REFUGEE LAWS.
21
Revised Commentary on Common Article 3, supra note 8, ¶ 546.
22
There was extensive debate during the drafting of the Elements of Crimes for the
International Criminal Court over the relative merits of the terms “perpetrator” or “accused.”
Though some delegations were concerned that the term “perpetrator” would undermine the
presumption of innocence, the delegates to the Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) ultimately
agreed to use it in the Elements after including a comment in the introductory chapeau that
“the term ‘perpetrator’ is neutral as to guilt or innocence.” See Rep. of the Prep. Comm’n for
the Int’l Crim. Court, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/INF/3/Add.2 (Nov. 2, 2000), in KNÜT
DORMANN, ELEMENTS OF WAR CRIMES UNDER THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT 14 (2002).
18
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child soldiers and the war crimes of sexual slavery against those same
persons refers to “children under the age of 15 years of age who were
members of the UPC/FPLC [using the titles of the insurgent non-state actor
forces]” were warranted under Common Article 3.23 The ICC Prosecutor
amended the original charges against Ntaganda to include violations of
Article 8(2)(e)(vi) on the basis of rape and sexual slavery committed within
the rebel force against conscripted child soldiers within that force.24 On its
face, Article 8(2)(e)(vi) criminalizes a variety of acti rei that encompass a
wide range of sexual violence “also constituting a serious violation of
article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions.”25 Pre-Trial Chamber II
confirmed those charges by reasoning that because the Rome Statute
specifically criminalizes conscription or recruitment of child soldiers,
the mere membership of children under the age of 15 years in
an armed group cannot be considered as determinative proof of
direct/active participation in hostilities, considering that their
presence in the armed group is specifically proscribed under
international law in the first place. Indeed, to hold that children
under the age of 15 years lose the protection afforded to them
by IHL merely by joining an armed group, whether as a result
of coercion or other circumstances, would contradict the very
rationale underlying the protection afforded to such children
against recruitment and use in hostilities.26
Reflecting this stance, the drafters of the Revised ICRC Commentary
subsequently cited the Prosecutor’s position and provided only the oft-cited
pablum from the Nicaragua case in the International Court of Justice that
Common Article 3 provides protections of such fundamental character that
they reflect the “minimum yardstick” of treatment applicable in all armed
conflicts.27 Common Article 3 on its face reflects basic considerations of
humanity, which is reflected by the extension of protections to “any time and
23

Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06-804, Prosecution Response to the
“Application on behalf of Mr. Ntaganda challenging the jurisdiction of the Court in response
to Counts 6 and 9 of the Document Containing the Charges, ¶ 6 (Sept. 11, 2015) (emphasis
added), https://www.icc-cpi.int/pages/record.aspx?docNo=icc-01/04-02/06-818.
24
Id. at Pre-Trial Chamber II, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application under Article 58,
¶ 44 (July 13, 2012), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2012_07506.PDF.
25
Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8(2)(e)(vi).
26
Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06-804, Pre-Trial Chamber II, Decision
Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor
Against Bosco Ntaganda, ¶ 78 (June 9, 2014), https://www.icc-cpi.int/courtrecords/cr2012.07
506.pdf [hereinafter Ntaganda Confirmation of Charges Decision].
27
Revised Commentary on Common Article 3, supra note 8, ¶ 356.
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in any place whatsoever.”28 For a provision seeking to maximize respect for
human dignity and the fundamental human rights of persons adversely
affected by armed conflicts not of an international character, this breadth is
both logical and wholly legitimate.
The International Court of Justice and other tribunals have been clear in
the decades since the 1949 adoption of Common Article 3 that its character
and coverage are fundamental in terms of providing a baseline of
humanitarian protection. Extending this tenet, Trial Chamber VI opined that
prohibitions on rape represent jus cogens norms, which necessarily implies
that such conduct is “prohibited at all times, both in times of peace and
during armed conflicts, and against all persons, irrespective of any legal
status.”29 That conclusion is inarguable on its face, but the very fact that
such conduct is criminally proscribed is quite a different question from a
precise assessment of the circumstances and persons that benefit from the
admittedly fundamental protections of Common Article 3.
In its
authoritative Revised Commentary, the ICRC provided no intellectual
buttressing for the novel proposition that Common Article 3 extends to intraforce offenses, notwithstanding the fact that no international or domestic
tribunal or court has so opined in the sixty-seven-year history of the 1949
Geneva Conventions.
The ICRC simply relied upon the Prosecutor’s framing of that
“innovation” in Ntaganda, along with the implicit inference that the
extension of humanitarian protections warranted the use of the laws of war
rather than any other normally applicable provisions of domestic criminal
law. It is telling to close readers that there is no justification provided by the
ICRC drafters for such an expansion of Article 3. Simultaneous rumors in
The Hague at the time of this writing of deliberate coordination between the
ICC Office of the Prosecutor and the ICRC do little to disquiet the sense
that there is something untoward in this unilateral extension of previously
accepted understandings. In fact, following the release of the Revised ICRC
Commentary, Trial Chamber VI denied renewed jurisdictional challenges
raised by the defense by relying in part on the observation that the ICRC
perspective is “noteworthy” and “consistent with humanitarian principles”
that are integral to the law of armed conflict.30
The circularity of sources is striking in that the ICRC relied upon the
filings of the ICC Prosecutor as its primary source of authority, and the ICC
28

Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, Nicaragua v. United
States, Merits, Judgement 1986, I.C.J. Rep. 14 ¶¶ 218–219.
29
Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06-804, Trial Chamber VI,
Second Decision on the Defence’s challenge to the jurisdiction of the Court in respect of
Counts 6 and 9, ¶ 52 (Jan. 4, 2017), https://www.icc-cpi-int/CourtRecords/CR2017_00011.
30
Id. ¶ 51.
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Trial Chamber in turn relied upon the purportedly authoritative ICRC
position as the capstone of its legal analysis. In filing its revised charging
document for a warrant of arrest of Bosco Ntaganda, the OTP relied upon the
provisions of Article 8(2)(e) rather than Common Article 3 (Article 8(2)(c))
in charging the sexual offenses committed intra-force against the conscripted
child soldiers.31 The Pre-Trial Chamber referenced broader prohibitions
found in other parts of international humanitarian law such as Protocol II32
and injected Common Article 3 into its analysis by hypothesizing that the
“sexual character of these crimes, which involve elements of force/coercion
or the exercise of rights of ownership, logically preclude active participation
in hostilities at the same time.”33
However, Pre-Trial Chamber II implicitly rejected any presumption that
Common Article 3 provides sufficient stand-alone authority to sustain intraforce offenses. The operative paragraph of the Ntaganda Confirmation of
Charges expressly states that
the Chamber finds that UPC/FPLC child soldiers under the age
of 15 years continue to enjoy protection under IHL from acts of
rape and sexual slavery, as reflected in article 8(2)(e)(vi) of the
Statute. The Chamber is, therefore, not barred from exercising
jurisdiction over the crimes in counts 6 and 9.34
Despite the fact that the ICC jurisdiction was explicitly grounded in other
provisions applicable to armed conflicts not of an international character, the
Revised ICRC Commentary subsequently relied upon Ntaganda as the only
referenced authority for expanding the normative scope of Common Article
3. In its early 2017 ruling on a second challenge to ICC jurisdiction, Trial
Chamber VI buttressed its own analysis by relying on the ICRC position to
conclude that “persons alleged to have been ‘child soldiers’ . . . are to be
considered as ‘members’ of this armed force at the relevant time.”35 Its
penultimate conclusion that “members of the same armed force are not per se
excluded as potential victims of war crimes of rape and sexual slavery” is
based on the broader protections applicable in non-international armed
conflicts as well as the wholly unprecedented and factually unnecessary
31
Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06-804, Pre-Trial Chamber II,
Decision on the Prosecutor's Application under Article 58, ¶ 44 (July 13, 2012), https://www.
icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2012_07506.PDF.
32
Ntaganda Confirmation of Charges Decision, supra note 26, ¶¶ 77–78, https://www.icccpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2014_04750.pdf.
33
Id. ¶ 79.
34
Id. ¶ 80.
35
Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06-804, Second Decision on the Defence’s
challenge to the jurisdiction of the Court in respect of Counts 6 and 9, ¶ 53 (Jan. 4, 2017).
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extension to combatants participating in an international armed conflict
governed by the provisions of Article 8(2)(b)(xxii).36
Finally, while the ICC Appeals Chamber upheld the Trial Chamber’s
findings with respect to the second jurisdictional challenge on June 15, 2017,
its decision notably fails to provide specific legal authority for an expanded
interpretation of Common Article 3’s plain textual scope. The Appeals
Chamber noted the ICRC Commentary finding that Common Article 3 could
be stretched to protect members of armed forces from offenses committed by
the armed force to which they belong, but observed that its supporting
sources were “limited and include a decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber in this
very case.”37 The Appeals Chamber implicitly reaffirmed the textual
limitations by noting in dicta that “Common Article 3 provides for
unqualified protection against inhumane treatment irrespective of a person’s
affiliation, requiring only that the persons were “taking no active part in
hostilities at the material time.”38 The legal substance of the Appeals
Chamber rests on the finding that “international humanitarian law does not
contain a general rule that categorically excludes members of an armed
group from protection against crimes committed by the same armed
group.”39 This finding in turn warranted the legal conclusion that the
“established framework of international law” does not preclude charges for
intra-force offenses under the provisions of article 8(2)(b)(xii) and article
8(2)(e)(vi) of the Rome Statute.”40 The Appeals Chamber’s decision is
notable because it held that the so-called “Status Requirements” of article
8(2)(a)(which replicate the grave breach provisions of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions) or of article 8(2)(c)(replicated Common Article 3 as noted
above) do not apply to charges under the other war crimes provisions of the
Rome Statute. In other words, the Appeals Chamber expressly grounded its
reasoning on the contradistinction between the grave breach provisions of the
Geneva Conventions and Common Article 3 which both “make explicit
reference to Status Requirements.”41
Thus, at the time of this writing, the Revised ICRC Commentary is the
only extant authority that posits the proposition that the core provisions of
Common Article 3 are sufficiently expansible to cover crimes committed
intra-force during non-international armed conflicts as a blanket matter.
36

Id. ¶ 54.
Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06 OA5, Appeals Chamber,
Judgment on the appeals of Mr. Ntaganda against the “Second Decision on the Defence’s
challenge to the jurisdiction of the Court in respect of Counts 6 and 9, ¶ 61 (June 15, 2017),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/record.aspx?docNo=ICC-01/04-02/06-1962.
38
Id. ¶ 60.
39
Id. ¶ 63.
40
Id. ¶ 67.
41
Id. ¶ 46.
37
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There is no hint of state practice or broader opinio juris to support that
assertion by the ICRC. The use of other provisions of the Rome Statute in
lieu of article 8(2)(c) to prosecute perpetrators who committed crimes of
sexual violence against child soldiers who were conscripted into a non-State
irregular armed force is indeed satisfying on a human level. However, the
ICRC provides no support whatever to sustain its policy position that an
extension of Common Article 3 protections (which limit its scope to persons
taking no active part in hostilities, as noted above) is warranted, or why such
a significant reconceptualization of Article 3 is useful to the field (apart from
the inference that the intent is to assist the ICC Prosecutor). There is no
explanation at all why charges under applicable domestic law or the parallel
crimes against humanity provisions are insufficient to protect the
fundamental rights of child soldiers when warranted by the evidence.
Phrased another way, the ICRC provides no support whatever for its
revolutionary extension of Common Article 3 to provide protections as a
matter of established international law to persons beyond its explicit textual
limits who are “taking no active part in hostilities.”
This Essay concludes by summarizing the potentially problematic aspects
occasioned by such an extension. Firstly, international law is clear that a
perpetrator can never be convicted “based upon a norm which an accused
could not reasonably have been aware of at the time of the acts, and this
norm must make it sufficiently clear what act or omission could engage his
criminal responsibility.”42 It is well established that “customary international
law imposes criminal liability for serious violations of common Article 3.”43
The Rome Statute itself reflects the core precept nullem crimen sine lege
with the requirement in Article 22 that the concept of a crime sufficient to
impute individual responsibility “shall be strictly construed and shall not be
extended by analogy. In [the] case of ambiguity, the definition shall be
interpreted in favour (sic) of the person being investigated, prosecuted or
convicted.”44 In practice, this standard means that “that the conduct in
question is regarded as criminal under that body of law and that individual
criminal responsibility may be imposed in case of breach.”45 Thus, it should
have been dispositive for ICRC purposes that the ICC Elements of Crimes
specifies that Common Article 3 protects only victims that “were either hors
de combat, or were civilians, medical personnel, or religious personnel
42
Prosecutor v. Vasiljević, IT-98-32-T, Trial Chamber II, Judgment, ¶ 193 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. For the former Yugoslavia, Nov. 29, 2002).
43
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defense Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 134 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia, Oct.
2, 1995).
44
Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 22(2).
45
Vasiljević, supra note 42 (emphasis added).
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taking no active part in hostilities.”46 The ICRC simply ignored the due
process ramifications of imposing its policy preference in extending
Common Article 3 to cover intra-party offenses.
Similarly, the ICRC provided no justification for its position in the
Revised Commentary that the substantive scope of Common Article 3 should
depart so radically from the textual limits that were so important to the
original negotiations. In fact, many states were hesitant to adopt Article 3
because of its potential for protecting criminals in civil war or other types of
conflict. In light of this reluctance, it should be viewed narrowly,
notwithstanding the modern teleological impulse to extend its coverage to all
persons at all times. To reiterate, other overlapping provisions of law
proscribe the acts of perpetrators committed against members of their own
armed forces, so the notion that expansion of Common Article 3 is required
to fill a lacunae in enforcement is not supported in practice. It is worth
recalling that the original ICRC position during the drafting of the 1949
Geneva Conventions, soundly rejected by the actual delegates, sought to
craft Article 3 to simply mirror the range of protections applicable to
participants in international armed conflicts. Contrary to the bland ICRC
assertion in the Revised Commentary, the deliberate intention of Article 3 at
the time of its drafting was not to provide the broadest possible coverage of
protections to all persons with a nexus to an armed conflict of a noninternational character.
The travaux provide three reasons why the ICRC extension is
unsupportable based on the development of Common Article 3. Firstly,
delegates were primarily concerned over what types of opponents would
receive the newly crafted protections. At the beginning of the discussion of
Common Article 3 in the Joint Committee, France expressed concerns that
civilians on the opposing side in a civil war would be entitled to receive
overly generous protection from the proposed article.47 The French
delegation argued that including insurgents within the scope of Common
Article 3 would undermine the sovereignty of the state and that the text
should make it impossible for insurgents to “claim the protection of the
Convention under a mask of politics or any other pretext.”48 Greece echoed
the concern for protecting state sovereignty by stating that there was a danger
that rebels would be entitled to the protections of prisoners of war and would
46
KNÜT DORMANN, ELEMENTS OF WAR CRIMES UNDER THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 383 (2002).
47
FINAL RECORD OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE OF 1949, VOL. II, SECTION B10 (Federal
Political Department Berne 1949), https://www.loc. gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/Dipl-Conf1949-Final_Vol-2-B.pdf [hereinafter GENEVA CONVENTIONS FINAL DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE
RECORD].
48
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not be able to be charged for their crimes.49 While some delegations (inter
alia Romania) argued that Article 3 should have the broadest possible
application, this view was not shared by the majority of the delegates.50
Most of the delegates believed that the Article should be narrowly applied to
those opposing forces that were organized and professional rather than
bandits or anarchists in order to preserve the sovereign flexibility of the
territorial state.51
Secondly, the debates show that Common Article 3 as adopted was not
intended to provide the broadest possible umbrella of humanitarian
protections. Russia proposed an amendment that would have given
protection to all types of enemies and would have given prisoner of war
status to any opposing force.52 This proposal was overwhelmingly rejected
by twenty-five votes to nine, with three abstentions.53 During these debates,
the British delegation stated that “participating in hostilities” would apply to
opposing forces who had started an illegal war.54 The UK was clear
however, in claiming that the protection was afforded only to opposing
forces and not to members of one’s own military force.55 The record of
negotiations makes plain that the text was meant to protect only those
members of an opposing force.56
Finally, the overarching goal of the delegations was to preserve state
sovereignty by reserving the ability to prosecute criminals under extant
domestic laws. For example, the Burma delegation argued that adoption of
Common Article 3 would be “taking away” from the “legal machinery” of
the state to “maintain the security of its population and the prosperity of the
State . . . It is also not the object of the Conference to intervene in matters
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State.”57 In response, the
Russian delegation proposed that all of the Conventional protections should
apply in all conflicts and that a state should have no power to prosecute
crimes during an NIAC.58 This was overwhelmingly rejected, and with it the
ICRC preference lost any salience.59 Thus, Article 3 was specifically
intended to apply only to opposing forces, while preserving the full
prosecutorial discretion of the domestic state.
49
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The Swiss delegation argued that Article 3 strikes the perfect balance
between a state’s sovereignty and humanitarian protections because it
preserves the ability of the “legitimate government whose duty it is, in a noninternational war, to compel rebels and insurgents to respect the national law
of the country.”60 In light of the intentional design of Common Article 3,
and the clearly expressed preference of the delegates for a narrow application
of its protections, the Revised ICRC Commentary offers no support for its
policy-based assertion that the text may be extended to intra-force offenses.
The lingering whiff of an implicit interdependence between the ICRC and
the ICC Prosecutor’s Ntaganda filings is not dispelled by any evidence from
the travaux préparatoires.
Finally, the ICRC position with respect to Common Article 3 represents
something of an axial shift in the design of the entire field of jus in bello. It
cannot be overemphasized that the laws and customs of warfare balance
humanitarian objectives with the perfectly legitimate need to accomplish the
mission. The gründnorm for the entire scope of the “laws and customs
applicable in armed conflicts” (to borrow the language of the Rome Statute
in Article 8) is to build a careful balance between the ability of practitioners
to lawfully accomplish the military mission in a manner that, to the greatest
degree possible, respects the enduring value of humanitarian considerations.
Michael Waltzer is entirely correct in his conclusion that belligerent armies
are “not entitled to do anything that is or seems to them necessary to win
wars. They are subject to a set of restrictions that rest in part on the
agreements of states but that also have an independent foundation in moral
principle.”61 At the same time, the normative standards of jus in bello that
are intentionally designed to protect civilians and serve larger humanitarian
goals “reflect the inherent recognition of authority to employ such combat
power for the prompt and efficient defeat of an enemy.”62
The ICRC appears to elevate humanitarian concerns as the dominant
leitmotif of jus in bello in a manner that would represent a radical shift in its
intended function.
While international humanitarian law63 contains
numerous express prohibitions subject to no caveats, combatants properly
exercise what the ICRC has labeled a “fairly broad margin of judgment.”64
Therein lies the completely appropriate and distinctive permissiveness of the
laws and customs of armed conflict. For example, “effective advance
60
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warning shall be given of attacks which may affect the civilian population,
unless circumstances do not permit” (emphasis added).65
As a logical extension of the duality embedded within jus in bello,
medical care is due those in military custody only “to the fullest extent
practicable and with the least possible delay.”66 Other obligations are often
couched in aspirational terms such as “whenever possible”67 or “as widely as
possible.”68 Still more duties are couched in less than strident terms such as
“shall endeavour”69 or the duty to “take all practical precautions.”70 There
are also numerous express exceptions permitted for reasons of “imperative
military necessity.”71 International law is clear that those who order military
strikes must “do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be
attacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects”72 and “take all feasible
precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack with a view to
avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life,
injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.”73 Even in that evaluation,
it is important to note that the benchmark for “feasible” is measured from the
reasonable war-fighter’s point of view in a manner that deliberately
incorporates the twin foundations of jus in bello. The United Kingdom
clarified the term in its official treaty practice as follows: “The United
Kingdom understands the term ‘feasible’ as used in the Protocol to mean that
which is practicable or practically possible, taking into account all
circumstances ruling at the time, including humanitarian and military
considerations.”74
The United States has also adopted a similar
understanding of the term “feasible” in this jus in bello usage.75
65
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The key point that the Revised ICRC Commentary failed to acknowledge
much less persuasively address is that the proper balance between
humanitarian and military imperatives is intentionally and deeply integrated
into the law itself. Conversely, courts and commentators must be clear when
jus in bello applies or operates to displace other legally relevant criminal
norms.
As the ICTY Appeals Chamber noted in Kunarac, the
“determination of what constitutes a war crime is therefore dependent on the
development of the laws and customs of war at the time when an act charged
in an indictment was committed.”76 This is why the second circumstantial
element that is embedded in every war crime specified in the Rome Statute
requires evidence that “the perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances
that established the existence of an armed conflict.”77 In other words, there
is a fundamental due process right that convictions only be grounded in the
perpetrator’s knowledge that the jus in bello is applicable and should provide
the signposts for acceptable conduct.
Common Article 3 is part of the larger fabric of jus in bello, and on its
face deliberately preserved the applicability of domestic criminal sanctions to
persons participating in non-international armed conflicts. Just as individual
participants cannot lawfully inject individualized rationalizations as authority
for ignoring jus in bello norms, the ICRC ought not negate the interlocking
duality of provisions applicable to the conduct of non-international armed
conflict.
While superficially satisfying on a humanitarian basis,
superimposing the humanitarian imperatives of jus in bello as its dominant
component risks rupture to the carefully negotiated structure. The Revised
ICRC policy position extending the application of Common Article 3 to
intra-party offenses committed by participants in the conflict contorts its
meaning and clouds the larger normative framework of the field.
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